# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST	
II. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES	
III. STATUS OF CLAIMS	2
IV. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS	2
V. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER	2
VI. GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL	3
VII. ARGUMENT	5
VIII. CLAIMS APPENDIX	26
IX. EVIDENCE APPENDIX	31
X. RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX	32

# IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

In re Application of : Customer Number: 46320

Customer Number: 40320

Robert HARRIS : Confirmation Number: 6488

•

Application No.: 10/531,246 : Group Art Unit: 3689

Gloup Art Omt. 300

Filed: April 14, 2005 : Examiner: G. Araque Jr.

For: METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR RANKING SERVICES IN A WEB SERVICES

**ARCHITECTURE** 

# **APPEAL BRIEF**

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents Commissioner for Patents P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

This Appeal Brief is submitted in support of the Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2009, wherein Appellant appeals from the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 13, and 20-37.

### I. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

This application is assigned to IBM Corporation by assignment recorded on April 14, 2005, at Reel 017329, Frame 0025.

### II. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

Appellant is unaware of any related appeals and interferences.

# **III. STATUS OF CLAIMS**

Claims 1, 13, and 20-37 are pending and rejected. Claims 2-12, and 14-19 have been cancelled. It is from the multiple rejections of the claims that this Appeal is taken.

# **IV. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS**

The claims have not been amended subsequent to the imposition of the Second and Final Office Action dated August 17, 2009 (hereinafter the Second Office Action).

### V. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

Referring to Figs. 4A, 4B, and 5B and also to independent claim 1, a method for ranking services in a web services computer hardware architecture having a hierarchy 400 of services 406, 408, 410 with a root originating service requestor 401 is disclosed. A service 406 of a first level 402 in the hierarchy 400 calls a service 408 of a lower level 403. In 521, a preference is indicated regarding at least one service (page 13, lines 9-10), and based upon the preference, a ranking machine 405 uses a choice algorithm (page 13, lines 6-8). In 525, services of at least one level of hierarchy 400 are invoked (page 13, lines 19-20). A set of possible lower-level services are found, by a service, using a directory 411 at each level of the hierarchy 400 (page 10, line 32 through page 11, line 1). The choice algorithm is applied to the set of possible lower-level services (page 11, lines 1-6).

Referring to Figs. 4A, 4B, and 5B and also to independent claim 13, a web services computer hardware architecture is disclosed. The architecture includes a root originating service requester 401, a database, a directory 411, and a ranking machine 405 (page 10, lines 7-16). The database stores a hierarchy 400 of services 406, 408, 410 in which a service 406 of a first level

- 402 calls a service 408 of a lower level 403 (page 9, line 35 through page 10, line 8; page 11, lines 15-22). The directory 411 is used for finding services in the hierarchy 400 (page 10, lines 8-10). The ranking machine 405 is configured to apply a choice algorithm for services based on the originating service requestor's preference regarding one or more services (page 10, lines 17-22). At each level 402, 403 of the hierarchy 400, the directory 411 provides a set of possible services (page 10, line 36 through page 11, line 1) and the ranking machine 405 applies the choice algorithm to provide a sequence of preferred services (page 11, lines 28-31).
  - Referring to Figs. 4A, 4B, and 5B and also to independent claim 20, a computer program product for a web services architecture having a hierarchy 40 of services 401, 406, 408, 410 with a root originating service requestor 401 is disclosed. A service 406 of a first level 402 calls a service 408 of a lower level 403. The computer program product comprises computer readable medium having computer readable program code embodied therein and configured to cause a computer to perform the following operations. In 521, a preference is indicated regarding at least one service (page 13, lines 9-10), and based upon the preference, a ranking machine 405 uses a choice algorithm (page 13, lines 6-8). In 525, services of at least one level of hierarchy 400 are invoked (page 13, lines 19-20). A set of possible lower-level services are found, by a service, using a directory 411 at each level of the hierarchy 400 (page 10, line 32 through page 11, line 1). The choice algorithm is applied to the set of possible lower-level services (page 11, lines 1-6).

# VI. GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

- 1. Claims 1, 13, 21-27, and 31 were rejected under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112;
  - 2. Claims 1, 13, and 21-27 were rejected under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112;

3. Claims 1 and 21-31 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101;

4. Claims 1, 13, 20, and 27-37 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness based upon Mendelevitch et al., U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0130993 (hereinafter Mendelevitch).

# **VII. ARGUMENT**

1	THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 13, 21-27, AND 31 UNDER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF 35
2	<u>U.S.C. § 112</u>
3	For convenience of the Honorable Board in addressing the rejections, claims 21-27 stand
4	or fall together with independent claim 1, claim 13 stands or falls alone, and claim 31 stands or
5	falls alone.
6	
7	Although the Examiner did not refer to claim 31 in the title portion of the statement of
8	rejection on page 4 of the Second Office Action, Appellant notes that the Examiner did refer to
9	claim 31 in the last full paragraph on page 4 of the Second Office Action. Therefore, Appellant
10	proceeds under the assumption that the Examiner intended to reject claim 31 under the first
11	paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
12	
13	Claim 1
14	Referring to page 4 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following:
15 16 17 18 19	Specifically, the Examiner asserts that there is no support for (1 and 13) computer hardware, the step of finding a set of possible lower-level services, by a service (i.e. the service finding a set of possible lower-level services),
20	At the outset, Appellant notes that claims 1 and 13 do not recite "computer hardware" in
21	isolation. Instead, claims 1 and 13 recites a "web services computer hardware architecture."
22	Referring to paragraph [0003] of Appellant's disclosure, it is stated that "[w]eb services are
23	implemented in a network." Referring to paragraph [0042], Fig. 4B is described as "a schematic
24	block diagram of a web services architecture in accordance with the present invention." As
25	known by those skilled in the art, the term architecture refers to "the manner in which the

1	components of a computer or computer system are organized and integrated." Thus, the
2	discussion of a network and a web services architecture within Appellant's specification provides
3	adequate support for the term "web services computer hardware architecture" since one skilled in
4	the art would recognize that computer hardware is associated with both a network and a
5	computer architecture.
6	
7	With regard to the claimed "finding a set of possible lower-level services by a service,"
8	reference is made to paragraph [0072] of Appellant's specification, which is reproduced below:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	In the illustrated example of FIGS. 4A and 4B, a service requestor 401 wishes to use the service of an intermediate service provider of the first level 402 which involves using a lower level service. However, the fact that any lower level service is used is not revealed to the service requestor 401. The service requester 401 carries out a search using the directory 411 for service providers of the first level 402 and obtains a sequence of possible service providers 402. The sequence of possible service providers 402 has been filtered by the ranker machine 405 to remove obvious non-contenders or to force a specific selection (i.e. if only one result is in the bag). If there is more than one result in the bag, the service requestor 401 chooses one of the service providers 406 of the first level 402. (emphasis added)  Referring to the underlined portion of the above-reproduced passage, Appellant respectfully
20	submits that adequate descriptive supports exists for the claimed limitation of "finding a set or
21	possible lower-level services by a service,"
22	
23	<u>Claim 13</u>
24	Referring to page 4 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following:
25 26 27 28 29	Specifically, the Examiner asserts that there is no support for (Claim 13) a database.  At the outset, Appellant notes that claim 13 does not recite "a database" in isolation. Instead
30	claim 13 recites "a database storing a hierarchy of services in which a service of a first level calls
31	a service of a lower level." As would be recognized by those skilled in the art, a web services

 $<sup>^{1}\</sup> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/architecture.$ 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

hierarchy of services (see paragraphs [0066]-[0067] of Appellant's specification) is a data structure. As recited in claim 13, the directory finds services in the hierarchy. As also would be recognized by those skilled in the art, in order for a directory to find information (e.g., services) in a data structure (i.e., a hierarchy), the data structure is required be stored in some type of database. Thus, clear support for the term "database" is found within Appellant's specification. Claim 31 Referring to page 4 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following: Specifically, the Examiner asserts that there is no support for (Claim 31) upon a stored preference not being available, the service using the directory making the selection Original claims constitute their own description. In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 204 USPQ 702 (CCPA 1980). Claim 31 corresponds substantially to original claim 12 (now cancelled), which recited "wherein if there is no stored originating service requestor's preference, the service using the directory (411) makes the selection." Appellant's position is that there are no substantial difference between original claim 12 and claim 31. Thus, clear support for the language recited in claim 31 is found with Appellant's specification. THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 13, 21-37 UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF 35 U.S.C. **§ 112** For convenience of the Honorable Board in addressing the rejections, claims 13, 21-28, and 32-37 stand or fall together with independent claim 1; claim 29 stands or falls alone; claim 30 stands or falls alone; and claim 31 stands or falls alone.

$\sim$ 1		-
<i>(</i> ')	aım	- 1

In the tenth enumerated paragraph on page 5 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner newly presented the following assertions:

Claims 1 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being incomplete for omitting essential steps, such omission amounting to a gap between the steps. See MPEP § 2172.01. The omitted steps are: the step of ranking the services. (emphasis in original)

At the outset, Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner's reliance upon M.P.E.P. § 2172.01 is misplaced. Claim 1 recites "a ranking machine having a choice algorithm based on the preference ... applying the choice algorithm to the set of possible lower-level services," and claim 13 recites limitations. Although not explicitly recited, the ranking of services is already addressed by the above-reproduced claim language. Thus, the Examiner's analysis is misplaced.

#### Claim 29

In the eleventh enumerated paragraph on page 5 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner newly presented the following assertions:

In regards to **claim 29**, it is unclear how the claim is being performed since the service never made a selection to begin with and, as a result, it is unclear what is being overwritten.

Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner is confused as to the difference between the first and second paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Claims are only required to "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Thus, the claims are not required to "enable" the practice of the claimed invention. Instead, "[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention ... to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the same." The Examiner's comments, however, are directed to

<sup>-</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> First paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

1	how to make and use (i.e., enable) the claimed invention. Thus, the Examiner has failed to
2	establish a prima facie case of indefiniteness under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
3	
4	<u>Claim 30</u>
5	In the twelfth and thirteenth enumerated paragraphs on page 5 of the Second Office
6	Action, the Examiner newly presented the following assertions:
7 8 9 10 11 12	Claim 30 recites the limitation "the preferred service" in line 2 of claim 30. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim.  In regard to claim 30, it is unclear what is meant by "obtained by reference to original preference." Specifically, was there another preference present in the claim, which results in referring back to the original preference? What is the original preference? (emphasis in original)
13	Claim 1, upon which claim 30 depends, recites "indicating a preference regarding at least on
14	service." Appellant, therefore, respectfully submits that one having ordinary skill would have no
15	difficult in understanding the scope of claim 30 in that "the preferred service" refers to the
16	preference being indicated regarding the at least one service.
17	
18	As to the Examiner's second assertions, the "original preference" was first introduced
19	within claim 30.
20	
21	Claim 31
22	In the fourteenth enumerated paragraph on page 5 of the Second Office Action, the
23	Examiner newly presented the following assertions:
24 25 26	In regards to <b>claim 31</b> , when was the preference stored? Since it was never stored when would this step never occur?
27	Yet again, the Examiner confuses enablement under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 with
28	indefiniteness under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The Examiner question "when
29	was the preference stored?" is not a question of indefiniteness. The preference was stored prior

to the step recited in claim 31, which is evident by the claim language itself. The term "stored" is
a past participle, which represents a past or completed action. Therefore, the "stored preference"
occurred prior to the step at issue (i.e., "upon a stored preference not being available, the service
using the directory making the selection").
The Examiner's rejection is as nonsensical as rejecting a claim directed to "a method of
baking a cake comprising the step removing the cake of the oven after the internal temperature of
the cake reaches 350 degree Fahrenheit" because it omits the steps of (i) turning on the oven; (ii)
placing a cake pan in the oven, (iii) placing cake batter in the cake pan; (iv) mixing the cake
batter in a bowl; (v) placing constituents parts of the cake batter into the bowl; (vi) obtaining the
cake pan; (vii) obtain the bowl; and ad infinitum. For any claimed method, there are a number of
steps that could be omitted (e.g., ranking the services or storing a preference). However, the fact
that these steps are not explicitly recited does not render a claim indefinite.
THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1 AND 21-31 UNDER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF 35 U.S.C. §
<u>112</u>
For convenience of the Honorable Board in addressing the rejections, claims 21-31 stand
or fall together with independent claim 1.
Independent claim 1 is directed to a "method for ranking services" (emphasis added). 35
U.S.C. § 101 states that:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,

manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement

1	thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
2	of this title.
4	Within In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), the Federal Circui
5	"[clarified] the standards applicable in determining whether a claimed method constitutes a
6	statutory 'process' under § 101." The Federal Circuit framed the issue as to whether a claimed
7	method constitutes a statutory process as follows:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The true issue before us then is whether Applicants are seeking to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental process. And the underlying legal question thus presented is what test or set of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") or courts as to whether a claim to a process is patentable under § 101 or, conversely, is drawn to unpatentable subject matter because it claims only a fundamental principle.
15	At the outset, Appellant notes that the Examiner has neither alleged nor provided any substantia
16	evidence to support a finding that claim 1 attempts to claim either a fundamental principle or a
17	mental process. Therefore, the Examiner's has failed to set forth a prima facie case under 35
18	U.S.C. § 101.
19	
20	Claim 1 also recites "invoking services of at least one level of hierarchy." As also recited
21	in claim 1, the services being referred to are web services. The term "web service" is a term-of-
22	art that has a very specific meaning to those skilled in the art. A discussion of web services is
23	found within the Background of Invention portion of Appellant's specification. Not inconsisten
24	with this discussion within Appellant's specification, the following is a description of Web
25	service: <sup>4</sup>
26 27 28 29 30	A Web service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards.

<sup>4</sup> http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-gloss/.

1 2 To be clear, the W3C (i.e., World Wide Web Consortium) is the main international standards 3 4

5

6

7

8

9

organization for the World Wide Web. As such, to those skilled in the art, W3C represents the last word when it comes to standards regarding the internet. To invoke is "to put into effect or

operation,"5 and thus, to invoke services, as claimed, involves putting into operation a software

system. As would be recognized by those skilled in the art, putting into operation a software

system necessarily requires the use of a machine. Moreover, not only are not all machines so

capable, not even are computers are capable of putting into operation of the particular type of

software system referred to in claim 1. Therefore, claim 1 is tied to a particular machine and is

not solely a mental process.

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

10

Based upon the above-claim construction, claim 1 is clearly not a mental process since claim 1 is being performed with a machine. The only other issue that need be addressed is whether or not "[Appellant's] claim recites a fundamental principle and, if so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if allowed." Biliski at . The Examiner has not alleged that claim 1 is directed to a fundamental principle or even characterized what that "fundamental principle" might be. Thus, there is no need to determine if claim 1 preempts substantially all uses of the (unidentified) fundamental principle.

19

20

21

22

23

However, should the Examiner put forth substantial evidence to establish that claim 1 recites a fundamental principle, the Federal Circuit within In re Bilski looked to the following test to determine whether a process claim is narrowly tailored so as to not preempt all uses of the fundamental principle:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/invoke.

25

441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

1 2 3 A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. 4 Thus, the machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched inquiry – a method claim satisfies 35 5 U.S.C. § 101 by being tied to a particular machine or transforming an article. Gottschalk v. 6 Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 7 8 Turning to the first branch, as already noted above, claim 1 is necessarily tied to a 9 particular machine. Thus, since the method of claim 1 is tied to a particular machine and meets 10 the first test, claim 1 is directed to statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 11 12 THE REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 13, 21, AND 27-37 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103 FOR 13 **OBVIOUSNESS BASED UPON MENDELEVITCH** 14 For convenience of the Honorable Board in addressing the rejections, claims 13, 21, and 15 27-37 stand or fall together with independent claim 1. 16 On October 10, 2007, the Patent Office issued the "Examination Guidelines for 17 18 Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR 19 International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.," 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (2007) (hereinafter the Examination 20 Guidelines). Section III is entitled "Rationales To Support Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. 103." 21 Within this section is the following quote from the Supreme Court: "rejections on obviousness 22 grounds cannot be sustained by merely conclusory statements; instead there must be some 23 articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 24 obviousness." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,

Referring to the paragraph entitled "Office Personnel as Factfinders" on page 57,527 of the Examination guidelines, the following was stated:

Office personnel fulfill the critical role of factfinder when resolving the *Graham* inquiries. It must be remembered that while the ultimate determination of obviousness is a legal conclusion, the underlying *Graham* inquiries are factual. When making an obviousness rejection, Office personnel must therefore ensure that the written record includes findings of fact concerning the state of the art and the teachings of the references applied. In certain circumstances, it may also be important to include explicit findings as to how a person of ordinary skill would have understood prior art teachings, or what a person of ordinary skill would have known or could have done. Factual findings made by Office personnel are the necessary underpinnings to establish obviousness.

In <u>Graham v. John Deere Co.</u>, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), the Supreme Court set forth the factual inquiries that are to be applied when establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103. These factual inquiries are summarized as follows:

- (A) Determine the scope and content of the prior art;
- (B) Ascertain the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
- (C) Resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and
- (D) Evaluate any indicia of nonobviousness.

However, in order to make a proper comparison between the claimed invention and the prior art, the language of the claims must first be properly construed. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also, Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (In making a patentability determination, analysis must begin with the question, "what is the invention claimed?" since "[c]laim interpretation, ... will normally control the

- remainder of the decisional process.") See Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1460 (Fed. Cir.
- 2 1997) (requiring explicit claim construction as to any terms in dispute).

5 Non-analogous prior art

At the outset, Appellant notes that the Examiner's sole cited reference is non-analogous prior art. Whether a prior art reference is from a nonanalogous art involves (a) determining whether the reference is within the same field of endeavor and (b) determining whether the reference is reasonably pertinent to a known problem in the art. In re Clay, 23 USPQ2d 1058 (Fed Cir. 1992). If the prior art is outside the inventor's field of endeavor, the inventor will only be presumed to have knowledge of prior art that is reasonably pertinent to a known need or problem in the field of endeavor. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007). The Examiner is also charged to consider "the reality of the circumstances' ... in other words, common sense" to determine what field a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably be expected to look. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). With regard to this issue, the Examiner is also referred to M.P.E.P. § 2141.01, entitled "Analogous and Nonanalogous Art."

Whereas the claimed invention is directed to ranking services in a web services architecture, Mendelevitch is directed to categorizing incoming documents into topics. These are entirely different fields of endeavors. Since the Examiner has failed to establish that Mendelevitch is reasonably pertinent to a known need or problem in the field of endeavor, Mendelevitch is non-analogous prior art that cannot be properly applied against the claimed

invention. That Mendelevitch is non-analogous prior art is supported by the large list of items that, on page 8 of the First Office Action, the Examiner admits that Mendelevitch fails to teach.

### Mendelevitch fails to teach most limitations

Not only does the Examiner admit that Mendelevitch fail to teach many of the claimed limitations, the Examiner has failed to discharge the duty of performing a proper <u>Graham</u> analysis. Specifically, the Examiner has both failed to properly characterize the scope and content of the applied prior art and failed to properly ascertain the differences between the applied prior art and the claims at issue. On pages 9 and 10 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner continually refers to Mendelevitch as teaching certain limitations associated with "services." However, none of the teachings being relied upon by the Examiner are teaching the "services," as claimed. The passages cited by the Examiner deal with documents, not services.

As another example, claim 1 recites "indicating a preference regarding at least one service," for which the Examiner cited paragraphs [0014] and [0047] of Mendelevitch. Although paragraph [0014] refers to a "user configurable threshold," there is no disclosure that this user configurable threshold (presumably corresponding to the claimed "preference") regards at least one service (or even document). Instead, the configurable threshold appears to be unrelated to any service or document.

Regarding the claimed "finding a set of possible lower-level services, by a service, using a directory at each level of the hierarchy," on pages 9 and 10 of the First Office Action, the Examiner cited paragraph [0013] and claim 13 while also stating "a set of documents are

searched through a database [directory] which is arranged in a hierarchy structure." The 1 2 Examiner's disregard for the precise language of the claims is astounding. For example, the 3 language refers to using a directory at each level of the hierarchy. However, this concept has 4 been complete ignored within the Examiner's analysis. The claim language also refers to a 5 service finding lower-level services. This concept is also ignored within the Examiner's analysis. 6 7 Referring to pages 11 and 12 of the Second Office Action, Appellant is incredulous that 8 the Examiner would assert: 9 However, the Examiner asserts that the data stored in the directory is directed to non-10 functional descriptive subject matter. That is to say, the type of data, i.e., lower-level services, 11 level of services, service requestors, and service providers, does not affect how the method is 12 13 stored or stores the information. The type of data adds little, if anything, to the claim's structure, and thus, does not serve as a limitation on the claims to distinguish over the prior art. As claimed 14 the steps of the invention would be performed in the same manner regardless of the type of data 15 that is being processed or stored. 16 17 When determining whether a claim is obvious, an examiner must make "a searching comparison 18 of the claimed invention - including all its limitations - with the teaching of the prior art." In re 19 Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, "obviousness requires a 20 suggestion of all limitations in a claim." CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Intern. Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 21 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974)). By refusing to give 22 patentable weight to all the limitations at issue, the Examiner has committed clear legal error.

23

24

25

26

27

28

Notwithstanding the Examiner committing legal error by failing to consider all of the limitations of the claim, the Examiner's analysis is predicated upon wrong assumptions. The type of data being processed, stored, manipulated, etc., absolutely affects how any particular method involving those steps is performed. For the Examiner to infer otherwise evidences an exceptional lack of knowledge with regarding to computer-implemented devices/methodology.

1 If, for example, the expected data is not in the form required for processing/storing/manipulating,

- 2 then an error can occur and/or the data is not proper processed/stored/manipulated. In a more
- 3 particular example, if a method of numerically adding two inputs receives, as inputs, the letters
- 4 "j" and "k," then the adding step will not be performed.

5

- The above-reproduced arguments (incorporated herein) were substantially previously-
- 7 presented on page 14, line 5 through page 17, line 9 of the First Amendment. Although the
- 8 Examiner presents responsive arguments on pages 15-19 of the Second Office Action, the crux
- 9 of the Examiner's argument and clear evidence of Examiner error is found in the last full
- paragraph on page 15 of the Second Office Action and is reproduced below:

Specifically, the Examiner has stated in the rejection that the type of data that is being analyzed is nothing more than non-functional descriptive subject matter. It is asserted that the claimed invention is nothing more than a program that allows a user to rank, i.e. reorganize, data. What that data is supposed to be is completely irrelevant to how the invention is carried out. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the claimed invention would perform the same regardless of what data is being analyzed. (emphasis added)

16 17 18

11

12

13

14

15

Despite the Examiner's factually unsupported assertion to the contrary, what the type of data

being analyzed is entirely relevant to how the invention is carried out.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

By way of absurd example to match the Examiner's absurd analysis, consider that the data to be ranked is chickens. Specifically, the data describes the weight of the chickens. If the Examiner's assertion that "[w]hat that data is supposed to be is completely irrelevant to how the invention is carried out," then the Examiner should be able to explain how the methodology of claim 1 can be employed to rank chickens. This is a rhetorical request since the Examiner would be unable to rank chickens using the methodology of claim 1. For example, chickens (like the documents of the Examiner's cited reference within Mendelevitch) are not services. Moreover, Appellant is unclear as to how chickens (or the documents of Mendelevitch) fit within the claim

language of "a web services architecture having a hierarchy of services." Still further, Appellant is unclear how it would be possible, while employing the data about chickens (or the documents of Mendelevitch) to "[find] a set of possible lower-level services." For example, Appellant could not even guess as to what would be the "set of possible lower-level services" associated with data about chickens (or the documents of Mendelevitch). These identified inconsistencies between the Examiner's assertion as to "[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the claimed invention would perform the same regardless of what data is being analyzed" and reality are only a small subset of the inconsistencies that Appellant can identify. However, to avoid belaboring the point, Appellant will stop at those inconsistencies already identified.

In the second full paragraph on page 16 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following:

To be more specific, the Examiner asserts that <u>the claimed invention is nothing more than</u> <u>the ranking of information</u> and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that whether it is directed towards ranking services or documents the steps are still being performed the same. (emphasis added)

As evident from the above-reproduced passage, the Examiner has distilled the invention down to "the ranking of information." However, distilling an invention down to the "gist" or "thrust" of an invention disregards the requirement of analyzing the subject matter "as a whole." W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). Thus, the Examiner's analysis has ignored the specific limitations being claimed.

Not only has the Examiner improperly attempted to ignore the claimed invention, as a

whole, the Examiner's analysis is internally inconsistent. On one hand, referring to page 5 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the "the step of ranking the services" was omitted from the claims. However, on the other hand, the Examiner is asserting that the claimed invention is "nothing more than the ranking of information." Assuming arguendo that the "step of ranking the services" was omitted from the claims, as alleged by the Examiner, then the claimed invention must necessarily be directed to more than the ranking of information – contrary to the Examiner's assertion.

In the last two full paragraphs on page 16 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following:

Regarding the applicant's argument that **Mendelevitch** is only directed towards categorizing the information is incorrect. As seen in **Page 1 Paragraph 12, Mendelevitch** is directed towards classification and **ranking.** 

As a result, the Examiner asserts that **Mendelevitch** is, indeed, analogous art since the claimed invention and **Mendelevitch** are both directed towards the ranking of information. Since the Examiner has clearly stated that **Mendelevitch** is analogous art and does, indeed, perform the steps as disclosed in the claimed invention it is being further asserted that the scope and content of the applied prior art are being properly characterized. (emphasis in original)

At the outset, Appellant notes that the Examiner has mischaracterized Appellant's previous comments. Appellant did not argue that "Mendelevitch is only directed towards categorizing the information" (emphasis added). Instead, Appellant wrote "Mendelevitch is directed to categorizing incoming documents into topics." Although Mendelevitch does refer to ranking, this ranking is an integral part of the categorization taught by Mendelevitch. Specifically, referring to paragraph [0051], Mendelevitch teaches:

2. Ranking. A confidence score is calculated for each document-topic association that was determined during classification. This confidence score provides a measure of the degree to which the document does in fact belong to that particular topic.

Thus, Appellant's prior categorization of Mendelevitch is accurate.

The Examiner's assertion that since both Mendelevitch and the claimed invention are both directed to "the ranking of information" constitutes gross over-reaching by the Examiner. If the Examiner's "field of endeavor" is accurate, then the Examiner could pull in teachings as disparate as the ranking of chickens based upon weight, the ranking of different qualities of aluminum alloys, to the ranking of different types of gasoline, to the ranking of graduate programs, to the ranking of pages returned by a website, to tennis rankings. All of these involve the ranking of "information." However, Appellant's position is that all of these are not within the same field of endeavor.

In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 26 USPQ2d 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the patent claims were directed to single in-line memory modules (SIMMs) for installation on a printed circuit motherboard for use in personal computers. A reference describing a SIMM for an industrial controller was held to not necessarily be in the same field of endeavor as the claimed subject matter merely because it related to memories. Instead, the Court held that the reference was found to be in a different field of endeavor because it involved memory circuits in which modules of varying sizes may be added or replaced, whereas the claimed invention involved compact modular memories. Although a field of endeavor of "memory devices" would certain be a more focused field than the Examiner field of endeavor of "ranking of information," the Federal Circuit held that such a field of endeavor was still too broad. Appellant's position is that the Examiner's proposed field of the endeavor is overly broad and encompasses incredibly disparate concepts – more so than the field of endeavors discussed

within <u>Wang Laboratories</u> and held by the Federal Circuit as not being within the same field of endeavor. Therefore, Appellant maintains that Mendelevitch is non-analogous prior art.

# On page 17 of the Second Office Action, the Examiner asserted the following:

As can be seen here, **Mendelevitch** does, indeed, disclose that a preference (threshold) is being indicated and that it is in regards to a selected piece of information (<u>see discussion above regarding non-functional descriptive subject matter and that documents and services can be used interchangeably without changing the steps of the invention). In other words, **Mendelevitch** discloses that the threshold is, indeed, related to the document since it is being used by the ranking module in order to determine whether the document falls within the user's preference (threshold). That is to say, the ranking module uses the threshold (preference) indicated by the user as a means of ranking the documents. (emphasis added)</u>

To follow upon the theme already touched upon above, the Examiner's analysis is not predicated upon establishing that the applied prior art renders the claimed invention obvious. Instead, the Examiner's analysis is predicated upon <u>improperly ignoring</u> most of the claimed inventions under the rubric that they are "non-functional descriptive subject matter." Similar assertions presented by the Examiner regarding "non-functional descriptive subject matter" is also found in the thirty-second enumerated paragraph on pages 17 and 18 of the Second Office Action.

# Mischaracterizes Mendelevitch

Notwithstanding that the Examiner has ignored most of the claimed limitations, the Examiner has failed to even properly characterize the teachings of Mendelevitch that the Examiner is relying upon. For example, the Examiner asserts that "the ranking module uses the threshold (preference) indicated by the user as a means of ranking the documents." This statement, however, is inaccurate. The ranking module described by Mendelevitch produces a ranking, which as described in paragraph [0051] as a confidence score. After the confidence score (i.e., the ranking) has been calculated for a particular document and after the classification

algorithm has been applied to the document, this confidence score is compared to a userconfigurable threshold (see claim 1 of Mendelevitch). Based upon this comparison (and the topic to which the document has been classified), the document is categorized with a first list for the topic or a second list for the topic. Thus, the ranking module does not use the threshold (i.e.,

allegedly corresponding to the claimed preference) for ranking. Instead, the threshold is used

6 <u>after</u> ranking.

Appellant's position is that the claimed invention does not recite "non-functional descriptive subject matter," as alleged by the Examiner. Claim 1 is a method that performs a variety of steps including "indicating a preference ...," "invoking services ...," "finding a set of possible lower-level services," and "applying the choice algorithm." Although these steps employ data structures (e.g., preference, hierarchy, level of the hierarchy) and computer programs (e.g., services), this functional descriptive material imparts functionality while being employed as part of a computer system.

Similarly, independent claim 13 recites components of a computer hard device to which the data structures (e.g., preference and hierarchy) and computer programs (e.g., services) impart functionality. For example, the ranking machine provides "a sequence of preferred services" (i.e., a specific data structure) because the "hierarchy of services" or a "requestor's preference regarding one or more services" impart functionality to the ranking machine. Therefore, the Examiner has improperly characterized the claim limitations at issue as being "non-functional descriptive subject matter."

1

# 2 <u>Conclusion</u>

- 3 Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner's rejections
- 4 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 112 is not viable. Appellant, therefore, respectfully solicits the
- 5 Honorable Board to reverse the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 112.

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is

hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17, 41.20, and in

connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-

0461, and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

Date: February 14, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

/Scott D. Paul/

Scott D. Paul

Registration No. 42,984

Steven M. Greenberg

Registration No. 44,725

Phone: (561) 922-3845

**CUSTOMER NUMBER 46320** 

### VIII. CLAIMS APPENDIX

1. A method for ranking services in a web services computer hardware architecture having a hierarchy of services with a root originating service requestor, a service of a first level in the hierarchy calling a service of a lower level, the method comprising:

indicating a preference regarding at least one service and a ranking machine having a choice algorithm based on the preference;

invoking services of at least one level of hierarchy;

finding a set of possible lower-level services, by a service, using a directory at each level of the hierarchy;

applying the choice algorithm to the set of possible lower-level services.

- 13. A web services computer hardware architecture comprising:
- a root originating service requester;
- a database storing a hierarchy of services in which a service of a first level calls a service of a lower level;
  - a directory for finding services in the hierarchy;
- a ranking machine configured to apply a choice algorithm for services based on the originating service requestor's preference regarding one or more services; wherein
- at each level of the hierarchy, the directory provides a set of possible services and the ranking machine applies the choice algorithm to provide a sequence of preferred services.

20. A computer program product for a web services architecture having a hierarchy of services with a root originating service requestor, a service of a first level calling a service of a lower level, the computer program product comprising:

a computer readable medium having computer readable program code embodied therein, the computer readable program code comprising computer readable program code configured to cause a computer to perform the operations of:

indicating a preference regarding at least one service and a ranking machine having a choice algorithm based on the preference;

invoking services of at least one level of hierarchy;

finding a set of possible lower-level services by a service using a directory at each level of the hierarchy;

applying the choice algorithm to the set of possible lower-level services.

- 21. The method according to claim 1, wherein the lower-level services are selected from service requestors and service providers.
  - 22. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

referring the set of possible lower-level services to the ranking machine from the directory, and

returning a preferred sequence by the ranking machine to the directory.

23. The method according to claim 22, wherein

the referring is not visible to the service using the directory.

24. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

sending the set of possible lower-level services by the service using the directory to the ranking machine; and

returning a preferred sequence by the ranking machine to the service.

25. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

returning a single result or a sequence of results to the service using the directory.

26. The method according to claim 1, wherein

lower-level invocations of services in the hierarchy are not visible to higher-level services.

27. The method according to claim 1, wherein

the preference comprises at least one of

ranking services in an order in which the originating service requestor intends to use the services,

excluding services from being used, and providing other selection-influencing criteria.

28. The method according to claim 1, wherein

the preference is based upon quality of service criteria comprising at least one of cost, efficiency, speed, and reliability.

reference to original preference.

29. The method according to claim 1, wherein the preference overrides a selection by the service using the directory.

30. The method according to claim 1, wherein

- upon the preferred service not being available, a subsequent service is obtained by
- 31. The method according to claim 1, wherein upon a stored preference not being available, the service using the directory making the selection.
  - 32. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 13, wherein the lower-level services are selected from service requesters and service providers.
  - 33. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 13, wherein the ranking machine is connected to the directory by a port, the set of possible services is referred to the ranking machine by the directory, and the sequence of preferred services is returned to the directory by the ranking machine.
  - 34. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 13, wherein a service of a first level finds a service of a lower level using a UDDI directory.

- 35. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 34, wherein the ranking machine has a port on the UDDI directory and processes flows turning TModel bags into a selected set of TModels.
- 36. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 34, wherein each UDDI operation is referred to the ranking machine and returned as a sequence conforming with a preference of a service requestor.
  - 37. A web services computer hardware architecture according to claim 34, wherein underlying UDDI application code:

carries out the referral, and

appends the location of the ranker machine to subsequent XML flow.

# IX. EVIDENCE APPENDIX

No evidence submitted pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.130, 1.131, or 1.132 of this title or of any other evidence entered by the Examiner has been relied upon by Appellant in this Appeal, and thus no evidence is attached hereto.

# X. RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX

Since Appellant is unaware of any related appeals and interferences, no decision rendered by a court or the Board is attached hereto.